New Deal Housing on the Virginia Peninsula: Challenging Jim Crow Paternalism at Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens by Carroll, Frederick James
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
2004 
New Deal Housing on the Virginia Peninsula: Challenging Jim 
Crow Paternalism at Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens 
Frederick James Carroll 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the American Studies Commons, Urban, Community and Regional Planning Commons, and the 
Urban Studies and Planning Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carroll, Frederick James, "New Deal Housing on the Virginia Peninsula: Challenging Jim Crow Paternalism 
at Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens" (2004). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 
1539626435. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-6h9d-b935 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
NEW DEAL HOUSING ON THE VIRGINIA PENINSULA: 
Challenging Jim Crow Paternalism at Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens
A Thesis 
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of American Studies 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
by
Fred Carroll 
2004
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Fred Carroll
Approved by the Committee, May 2004
Kimberley L. PHj/lips, chair
ureen A. Fitzgera
M. Darlene O’Dell
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS v
ABSTRACT vi
INTRODUCTION 2
CHAPTER I. THE NEW DEAL AND BLACK VIRGINIANS 6
Virginia’s New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism and Racial Paternalism 8 
Urban Black Life on the Virginia Peninsula 14
CHAPTER II. SWANTOWN: Moving In 23
Swantown: Moving Out 30
CHAPTER III. ABERDEEN GARDENS: Opportunity 36
Aberdeen Gardens: Challenge 43
CHAPTER IV. “THOSE WHO CAME IN FROM THE OUTSIDE...” 49
Swantown’s Failure 57
Aberdeen Gardens’ Success 61
APPENDIX 66
NOTES TO THE TEXT 71
BIBLIOGRAHPY 79
VITA 87
iii
LIST OF TABLES
Table
1. Population of Newport News by race, 1910-40
Page
66
iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Illustration Page
1. Black housing in Newport News, 1936 67
2. House in Swantown, 2004 68
3. Kitchen formerly used by Aberdeen Gardens tenant, 1937 69
4. Row of houses in Aberdeen Gardens, 1937 70
v
ABSTRACT
Two New Deal housing projects built on the Virginia Peninsula in the late 
1930s challenged Jim Crow strictures on race, space and class by giving 
working-class black families from Newport News, a bustling industrial city, an 
opportunity to own their own homes in the rural countryside. Such an opportunity 
disturbed the status quo of local race relations, as managed through a sense of 
genteel paternalism, by allowing black families to exercise the power of their 
pocketbooks to obtain a measure of equality and citizenship.
Swantown was a forty-one-unit segregated housing development built in 
1935 in Warwick County mostly for black shipyard workers and their families. The 
families obtained mortgages with the aid of the Federal Housing Administration, 
which insured a local bank against potential foreclosures. Newport News 
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock, the city’s leading employer, pushed for the project by 
supplying homebuyers, selling undeveloped land to the builder and supporting 
bank loans.
Aberdeen Gardens was a 158-unit segregated housing development built 
in 1936 in Elizabeth City County by a series of succeeding federal agencies, 
most notably the Resettlement Administration. Built “by Negroes, for Negroes,” 
the project sought to improve the lives of low-income black families by providing 
them with quality housing and plots for subsistence gardening. Hampton Institute 
provided local leadership by creating an all-black sponsoring committee, aiding 
with project planning and seeking endorsements from white business and 
political leaders.
Local white residents attempted to convert both projects to white 
occupancy. Swantown succumbed to those efforts following a trial on public 
nuisance charges related to failing septic tanks, while Aberdeen Gardens 
thwarted the opposition after promising not to expand its borders. This paper 
examines the role of federal agencies, local sponsors and black tenants in 
determining the fate of each development. It finds that inaction by the FHA and 
shipyard likely doomed black tenants’ chances at Swantown, while active support 
by all involved with Aberdeen Gardens gave it a chance to succeed.
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NEW DEAL HOUSING ON THE VIRGINIA PENINSULA: 
Challenging Jim Crow Paternalism at Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens
INTRODUCTION
James and Myrtle Brown bought a newly-built stucco house outside of 
Newport News, Virginia, in spring 1936 on a street named after Confederate 
officer Jeb Stuart. They lived in Swantown, a forty-one unit, segregated 
subdivision built in rural Warwick County and home mostly to black shipyard 
laborers and their families. James worked for Newport News Shipbuilding and 
Dry Dock, the leading employer on the Virginia Peninsula; Myrtle raised their 
three children. With federally backed mortgages, many urban black families, like 
the Browns, enjoyed a rare opportunity at Swantown to own the house they 
called home. That opportunity was short-lived. Less than a year after the Browns 
and other black families moved in, several white residents complained about 
them using faulty septic tanks, an all-white jury found them guilty of creating a 
public nuisance, a judge evicted them, banks foreclosed, and the Federal 
Housing Administration resold the houses with help from local Realtors — this 
time to white homebuyers instead of black ones. Today, Swantown remains a 
mostly white neighborhood. “They were just people who wanted something,” said 
Joyce Brown Wilkins, who was four years old when her parents left Swantown. 
“They wanted their children to have a home.”1
The Brown family moved into a brick house in 1938 in neighboring 
Elizabeth City County on Mary Peake Boulevard, which was named after a local 
freedwoman who taught the children of former slaves during the Civil War. The
2
3house was in a 158-unit, segregated resettlement homestead built and 
supervised by a series of federal agencies, most notably the Resettlement 
Administration. It was eventually named Aberdeen Gardens. Federal officials 
described the development as a project “by Negroes, for Negroes.” Construction 
at Aberdeen Gardens occurred at the same time as work in Swantown. White 
challenges also threatened this project. In Washington, D.C., Virginia Senator 
Harry F. Byrd criticized the entire homestead program as a waste of taxpayer 
dollars, and Peninsula leaders shared his views. Locally, white truck farmers 
attempted to thwart black occupancy by complaining to leading Peninsula 
businessmen that the project encroached on their properties. Unlike Swantown, 
Aberdeen Gardens remained a black neighborhood. James and Myrtle Brown 
lived there the rest of their lives, buying their house for $3,075 in November 1946 
as the federal government sold its resettlement projects. Today, mostly black 
families still live in Aberdeen Gardens, which is listed as a national landmark. 
“Everybody took pride in where they lived,” Wilkins said. “Everybody knew 
everybody, and it was a tight knit community.”2
Swantown’s failure and Aberdeen Gardens’ success represent on a local 
level the shortcomings and achievements of New Deal housing policies aimed at 
bettering the lives of low-income black laborers and their families. Fundamental 
differences determined the viability of each project before construction began. 
Three key factors included the degree of federal supervision and support, the 
level of advance public input sponsors sought from white political and business 
leaders, and the amount of advice sponsors sought from black leaders and
4prospective occupants. Swantown was built with little federal oversight and 
apparently without broad-based support and input from either the white 
establishment or the black community, underscoring an insensitivity to local race 
relations that likely doomed the project. Meanwhile, Aberdeen Gardens was built 
with direct federal supervision, and the project’s local sponsor, Hampton Institute, 
turned to both white and black community leaders for support before construction 
began, later renewing and reinforcing that support when faced with challenges 
that threatened the project’s completion. Hampton Institute also sought and 
heeded advice from tenants when building and managing the development.
The two projects illustrate that the failure or success of New Deal housing 
projects for black renters and homebuyers nationwide depended largely on the 
degree to which federal and local sponsors considered and massaged the local 
nuances of racism. The spending of substantial federal tax dollars for the benefit 
of black families necessarily challenged the strictures of Jim Crow segregation, 
which made for separate but not equal accommodations, by openly contesting 
established boundaries concerning race, space and class. Successful 
construction required federal and local sponsors to balance two, often 
contradictory, goals. They had to assure the local white establishment of a 
significant decision-making role in the project and of a financial austerity suitable 
for a project benefiting society’s bottom-tier citizens. They also had to satisfy the 
needs and desires of prospective black tenants and local black leaders who 
looked upon homeownership as a tangible symbol of race improvement and 
empowerment. Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens show how attempting to
5reconcile the two aims jeopardized a project’s success. A cursory overview of 
race relations across the nation in general and in Virginia and the lower Virginia 
Peninsula in particular during the 1930s begins to explain how the two projects 
came to be and how their fates were determined.
CHAPTER I 
THE NEW DEAL AND BLACK VIRGINIANS
New Deal policies, whether addressing employment, welfare, housing or 
other issues, often promised help to the poor and disadvantaged, regardless of 
race, during the worst of economic times. That promise seldom materialized into 
actual aid for black Americans, who as a whole were disproportionately 
disadvantaged economically before the Great Depression. Blacks generally 
received less than their fair share of federal dollars, which were often divvied up 
by local administrators comfortable with the local dictates of discrimination, 
regardless of the political rhetoric coming from Washington, D.C. This was 
particularly true in the South, where many conservative politicians refused to 
participate in welfare and relief programs, which they viewed as federal 
interference in state affairs. “Inexorably discrimination stalked Negroes in every 
Federal program. Although real benefits flowed from the New Deal bounty, 
Federal agencies dared not challenge entrenched habits,” writes historian 
George Brown Tindall in The Emergence of the New South.3
Blacks largely remained the first fired and last hired despite promises of 
new jobs and better wages associated with the early days of the New Deal. The 
National Recovery Administration, which was created in 1933 by the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, sought to stabilize different industries by regulating 
prices charged to consumers through the creation of codes of fair competition,
6
7minimum wages, maximum work hours and union organization. Blacks joked that 
NRA stood for “Negro Removal Administration” or “Negroes Ruined Again.” The 
NRA raised prices on consumer goods that blacks bought, while it also 
encouraged Southern white businessmen, who refused to pay black laborers the 
same wage as white workers, to either ignore wage provisions or to fire black 
workers. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, which was passed in 1933 to artificially 
boost crop prices, displaced three million black sharecroppers and tenants as 
Southern plantation owners reduced their crop acreage in exchange for federal 
subsidies, which they spent on labor-saving machinery, such as tractors. The 
Federal Housing Administration, which was created in 1934 and backed 
mortgages at Swantown, effectively reinforced prevailing patterns of residential 
segregation and extended segregation to undeveloped areas.4
Other federal programs at least hinted at the oblique changes that would 
begin to undermine the South’s “entrenched habits” in later decades. The 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration, which was created in 1933 by the 
Unemployment Relief Act, initially banned racial discrimination, but the angry 
response of Southern whites quickly induced policy changes that allowed for 
continued wage disparities between black and white workers, reduced the 
government’s minimum wage and granted state and local officials more control in 
administering relief programs. The National Youth Administration probably 
promoted African American interests more than any other federal agency. It 
adhered to prevailing customs of discrimination by segregating its projects by 
race and by training a majority of its black students in trade skills and domestic
8service, but it also hired black supervisors in every southern state and prohibited 
racial wage differentials. The Resettlement Administration and its successor, the 
Farm Security Administration, benefited southern blacks in a proportion equal to 
their percentage as southern farmers, despite a lack of resources and 
widespread opposition across the South. Aberdeen Gardens was one of the 
agencies’ projects.5
Historian Harvard Sitkoff traces the roots of the civil-rights movement to 
societal changes due in part to New Deal policies. Blacks credited President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt with elevating national recognition of racial issues through 
government precedents, such as the hiring of black administrators and the 
creation of special offices that dealt exclusively with how a department’s 
programs affected blacks. Some New Deal agencies at least acknowledged the 
prevalence and deleterious effect of racism to a degree previously unseen inside 
the federal government. As Sitkoff says, “These changes did little to ameliorate 
the continuity of racism staining the New Deal, but they would help transform the 
despair, the discouragement, the dreadful apathy of black southerners into a 
fighting conviction of a better world that could soon and surely be achieved.”6
Virginia’s New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism and Racial Paternalism
In Virginia, fiscal conservatism and racial paternalism further diluted the 
limited New Deal benefits available to black families. The state’s Democratic 
senators, Harry F. Byrd and Carter Glass, were among the earliest and most 
outspoken critics of the New Deal’s liberal economic policies, their independence
9bolstered by a single-party state political machine that controlled local politics 
through elected constitutional offices, such as sheriff, treasurer, clerk of courts 
and commissioner of the revenue. Historian Ronald L. Heinemann argues that 
the New Deal aided thousands of Virginians individually, but it contributed no 
long-lasting impact to the state overall. Heinemann attributes this to what he calls 
“progressive backwardness,” a term that broadly credits the state’s fiscal 
conservatism (as embodied in its popular pay-as-you-go road-building policy and 
abhorrence to tax increases), diversified economy and sense of rugged 
individualism for ameliorating the depression’s impact. Virginia ranked low in 
New Deal spending due to the mitigating effects of “progressive backwardness” 
and to the fears among politicians like Byrd and Glass of federal intrusion into 
state business, which harkened back to antebellum days. Even during the state’s 
worst economic times, the percentage of Virginians receiving direct relief was 
half that of the nation, with only two other states trailing it. The state contributed 
only $1,094 to programs operated by the Civil Works Administration, even though 
more than 200,000 unemployed Virginians registered with the agency. Virginia 
did not authorize funds for direct relief from the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration until after that agency was terminated. Overall, Virginia ranked 
twenty-seventh in total dollars spent in New Deal funding, and forty-third when 
figuring state spending on a per capita basis.7
Those people who struggled the most in Virginia before the Great 
Depression — sharecroppers, textile workers and urban slum dwellers — 
endured continued struggles in the 1930s. Blacks in particular suffered the
10
depression’s full force. They began the decade holding jobs that paid them less
r
than whites and living in houses more likely to be considered substandard. Black 
babies born in cities were twice as likely to die as white babies. Blacks were four 
times more likely to die from tuberculosis than whites, and they were four times 
more likely to be illiterate. As in other southern states, blacks in Virginia received 
less than their fair share of News Deal dollars, but Heinemann finds that they 
generally received a near equal share. Even so, federal aid did nothing to 
unhinge the status quo of institutional racism in Virginia since so few federal 
funds reached the black families living there.8
On the Peninsula, local officials adhered to the political conservatism that 
shaped the politics of their state leaders. U.S. Representative S. Otis Bland, a 
Democrat who represented the Peninsula, often cast votes that mirrored the 
positions of Glass and Byrd, opposing New Deal legislation between 35 percent 
and 39 percent of the time. In 1935, a delegation of Peninsula leaders visited 
Bland and Byrd in Washington, D.C., to oppose possible taxation legislation. 
Seventeen visiting officials attended the meeting, representing the Peninsula’s 
top politicians and businessmen. Circuit Court Judge C. Vernon Spratley spoke 
the underlying belief that fueled the opposition these men held to most New Deal 
policies: “We believe the country’s wealth lay in the stamina of its manhood, and 
we know that this stamina is weakened by the mush-cake softness of doles and 
handouts and devices for the taking from Paul, who works to give Peter, who 
chooses to be indolent and slothful.”9
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Virginia’s racial paternalism complemented its fiscal conservatism. Like 
other Southern states, Virginia moved inexorably toward legalized discrimination 
after Reconstruction. Enforced by law and local custom, Jim Crow segregation 
solidified during the first two decades of the twentieth century. White leaders 
neglected the education of black children, stripped black adults of the ballot, 
winked at racially charged lynchings and separated blacks from whites in most 
public places. As the Progressive era ended, historian Edward L. Ayers writes 
that, “The sanctity of the growing system of segregation had to be ensured. Any 
breach came to seem to whites a breach in the natural order. New generations of 
whites became squeamish about black people in ways their grandparents could 
never have imagined — or afforded."10
One example of the extremes to which race separation could be carried 
traced its origins to the Virginia Peninsula and the late arrival of a white Newport 
News woman in February 1925 to a dance recital at Hampton Institute, a 
technical and professional college in Hampton for young black men and women.
A packed auditorium forced a distraught Grace B. Copeland to sit next to black 
patrons. The incident prompted her husband, Walter Copeland, editor of the 
Newport News Daily Press, to pen an editorial three weeks later that attacked the 
school for encouraging the mingling of the races and for teaching and practicing 
“social equality between the white and Negro races.” Copeland cautioned that 
such equality was but a step toward mixed marriages. “Amalgamation would 
mean the destruction of the Anglo Saxon race in America and the substitution of 
a race of mulattoes. Rather than that should be, we would prefer that every white
12
child in the United States were sterilized, and the Anglo Saxon race left to perish 
in its purity.” Copeland’s cause was aided by his friend John Powell, a famed 
pianist and a founding member of the state’s Anglo-Saxon Clubs, which sought 
absolute racial purity for whites. Powell pounced on the incident by publicizing it 
statewide and pressuring Governor E. Lee Trinkle to publicly condemn Hampton 
Institute. In January 1926, state Delegate Alvin Massenburg of Elizabeth City 
County (future home of Aberdeen Gardens) introduced a bill to prevent the 
mingling of blacks and whites in places of public entertainment, such as halls, 
theaters and opera houses. The Public Assemblage Act of 1926, also known 
informally as the Massenburg Law after its sponsor, sailed through both the 
House of Delegates and Senate with few dissenting votes. Governor Harry F. 
Byrd, who succeeded Trinkle and had not yet run for the U.S. Senate, allowed 
the bill to become law without his signature. The act was the first and only 
segregation law of its kind in the nation.11
Historian J. Douglas Smith sees the Massenburg Law not as an extension 
of the “natural order” of segregation, as many contemporary white Virginians 
fervently hoped, but as a defensive gesture taken to protect an eroding system of 
“managed race relations” that “emphasized a particularly genteel brand of 
paternalism.” That system eroded as black Virginians redefined race relations 
themselves by abandoning en masse the suffocating, intimate paternalism and 
poverty of the country for the promise of better jobs, housing and education, first, 
in Virginia’s cities and, ultimately, in northern cities. Once freed from the 
countryside’s direct paternalistic oversight but tantalized by only partially fulfilled
13
prospects of better jobs and homes, urban blacks further altered race relations by 
directly challenging segregationist policies. Virginia’s white elites —  leaders in 
business, political and social circles —sought to maintain stability and order by 
enforcing segregation through civility, rather than race-baiting on one extreme 
and civil rights on the other. Such efforts imparted ruling white Virginians with a 
sense of enlightened leadership in race matters, even as black Virginians 
assumed their own leadership role.12
White elites frequently cited how few lynchings occurred in Virginia 
compared to other southern states as proof of their racial enlightenment.
Historian W. Fitzhugh Brundage attributes Virginia’s comparatively few lynchings, 
particularly in the urbanized Tidewater area, to economic reality rather than 
paternalistic tolerance. Virginia’s modernizing and diversifying economy relied 
upon black labor, and lynchings could spark labor unrest, which was bad for 
business and bad for the elite Virginians who profited from those businesses. 
White elites sought to protect their privileged place in society by restraining the 
violent excesses of institutionalized racism while also resisting pleas from black 
leaders and laborers for more rights. Exaggerated paternalism allowed them to 
do so with a feeling of benevolence. However, as Smith notes, “In remaining 
devoted to a conception of race relations that encouraged black advancement 
but denied the possibility of equality, white elites ran up against a conundrum to 
which paternalism offered no solution.” Black life in Depression-era Newport 
News illustrated the strong grip that paternalism maintained over race relations in
14
Virginia, while it also exposed the erosion of paternalism’s power in the face of 
gradual economic and social changes.13
Urban Black Life on the Virginia Peninsula
Founded in 1896 by railroad baron Collis P. Huntington, Newport News 
was a bustling industrial town built where the James River spilled into the 
Chesapeake Bay. The city’s population nearly doubled between 1910 and 1920 
as Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock, the city’s economic engine, 
increased production to ready the nation for its entrance into World War I. The 
city’s black population also doubled during that decade as rural black farmers 
and laborers moved to Newport News for better-paying shipyard jobs a few years 
before the Great Migration, a time after World War I when about five hundred 
thousand black farmers and laborers moved en masse to northern cities and, to a 
lesser extent, southern cities to escape the rural South’s pervading racism and 
chronic poverty. Newport News struggled through the 1920s. The shipyard nearly 
shut down when wartime production ceased. The city’s economic fortunes 
rebounded in the 1930s when a naval rebuilding program revived the area 
economy and helped the city avoid the worst of the Great Depression. “People 
were not reduced to selling apples in the street, bank failures were rare, and 
there were no bread lines,” according to the city’s centennial history.14
Newport News boasted a growing black middle class that strove to 
overcome a social system designed to lock it into an economically and politically 
inferior social position. Area businessmen formed the Newport News-Warwick
15
Business League in December 1937 to promote their businesses and draw new 
customers. Crown Savings Bank of Newport News was one of only three black- 
owned banks in Virginia in 1939. Resident Lavinia Marian Poe was the first black 
woman admitted to the Virginia bar. Thomas Newsome, a prominent black lawyer 
who also published the Newport News Star, the city’s black newspaper, greeted 
national black leaders at his stately Queen Anne-style home. In 1934, the Norfolk 
Journal and Guide, the South’s largest black-owned newspaper with 30,000 
subscribers, mentioned Poe and Newsome, among several others, as possible 
candidates for City Council. (Despite the rumors, no black candidates ran.) 
Newport News was a city where black residents and visitors generally described 
race relations “as good or excellent,” in large part due to the paternalistic 
oversight and pervading influence of the shipyard. Even so, the majority of 
Newport News’ black residents suffered the poverty, illiteracy and inequality 
fostered by Jim Crow segregation across the South.15
In the workplace, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock employed 
more black laborers — about three thousand in the late 1930s — than any other 
company in Virginia. Shipyard president Homer L. Ferguson perfectly illustrated 
how Virginia’s white leaders relied on a heightened form of paternalism to 
manage race relations, giving blacks opportunities but not equality. Ferguson, a 
native of Waynesville, North Carolina, served as shipyard president from 1915 to 
1940. State and federal officials regularly sought his comments and advice about 
black laborers. Progressive groups, such as the United Negro College Fund and 
the National Urban League, invited Ferguson to join their causes. He served as a
16
Hampton Institute trustee from 1928 to 1942 and also on the Virginia 
Commission on Interracial Cooperation. Ferguson called black labor a “great 
asset.” He advocated proper industrial training for black workers, and he urged 
Newport News officials to provide better schools and to build other municipal 
buildings to entice those workers to remain in the city rather than migrate to the 
North. Ferguson believed whites and blacks could work together in the same 
establishment, but he cautioned that “considerable care must be exercised in the 
selection of jobs.” He also cautioned that black laborers worked better in groups 
than alone. During the Massenburg Law controversy, Ferguson told a state 
Senate committee that Hampton Institute did not teach social equality, and he 
publicly promised that complaints about racial mingling during school events 
would be remedied or he and the other southern trustees would resign. 
Meanwhile, he and other community leaders quietly circulated word that 
residents should not involve themselves with the Hampton Anglo-Saxon Club, 
the local chapter of the statewide group that sought white racial purity. Such 
actions undermined the group’s local influence even as other chapters across 
Virginia crowed over their legislative success.16
Such progressive views on race may have ameliorated working conditions 
for black laborers at the shipyard, but they did nothing to end institutionalized 
discrimination there. The shipyard’s black employees continued to earn less than 
white co-workers, were relegated to semi-skilled jobs and were excluded from 
the shipyard’s apprentice school. A note in paycheck envelopes told black 
workers who to vote for on Election Day. The discrepancy between progressive
17
rhetoric and actual action to eliminate discrimination fits well the paternalistic 
beliefs that J. Douglas Smith attributes to Virginia’s white elites, and that historian 
William H. Chafe describes among white elite businessmen in Greensboro, North 
Carolina. In Greensboro, Chafe finds that the city’s largest, most powerful 
companies were among the most reluctant to integrate because top executives 
wanted to avoid conflict with their peers, hoped to protect existing class 
structures and failed to fully understand the reasoning behind black protests. 
Instead of integrating, white businessmen talked. According to Chafe, “Civility 
was what white progressivism was all about — a way of dealing with people and 
problems that made good manners more important than substantial action.”17 
Despite the shipyard’s discrimination, the Journal and Guide reported in 
July 1937 that most black workers there opposed joining the Committee on 
Industrial Organization, a union headed by John L. Lewis. The article said,
“Family life, and the welfare of schools, churches, social and fraternal agencies 
owe their growth and expansion to the shipyard payrolls.” Among the reasons 
cited by workers for opposing the union: the Newport News shipyard paid better 
than shipyards in Brooklyn, New York and Philadelphia; it allowed black 
membership on the Employees Representatives Committee; and, it contributed 
to social and recreational opportunities outside the workplace. (For example, the 
shipyard spent $50,000 to build a recreation center, which opened in 1937, for 
black residents.) Such concessions to black demands for more authority in the 
workplace fell far short of equal pay and job promotions, but they also presented 
worthwhile gains during a time of entrenched, legalized discrimination.18
18
The dual nature of the paternalistic beliefs held by Ferguson showed 
clearly in housing. The shipyard encouraged black workers to own houses by 
lending them money at low interest rates and by buying houses and reselling 
them to black workers at cost. However, Ferguson supported neighborhood 
segregation, viewing it as a way to protect black homeowners. He told U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce Robert P. Lamont in August 1930 that his company’s 
experience with employing black workers “leads me to the conclusion that the 
policy of segregation in residential areas is wise and the only one to follow in 
order to avoid that friction which always results in the Negro getting the worst of 
it. Pride of race and pride in performance should be stimulated, and the 
resentment that arises out of a too close contact with white people in a 
competitive way would be lessened.”19
Residential segregation often confined black families to the city’s most 
neglected neighborhoods. Almost half of Newport News’ black residents lived in 
an area called Bloodfield during World War I. Bloodfield had no sewer lines or 
garbage collection and was recognized as one of the state’s largest slum 
districts. A 1919 municipal survey found dilapidated houses, filthy backyards, 
overcrowding and no indoor toilets or running water throughout the city’s poorer 
sections, regardless of the occupants’ race. However, the report noted that the 
worst of such conditions existed in black districts. “Many of the people there are 
actually at the present time living like animals,” the survey’s authors wrote.20
The report’s language clearly reflected the bias of the improvement league 
that commissioned it. Leading white residents formed The Better Newport News
19
Association following a mass meeting called by the Rotary Club in 1919. The 
association, like other such progressive leagues in Virginia and across the South, 
approached municipal reform from the prospective of elite, business-oriented, 
conservative Democrats. As historian John Dittmer writes about Georgia 
progressives, “they were interested more in improving their own comfortable 
existence than in uplifting the masses, black or white.” Newport News’ white 
leaders concerned themselves with black neighborhoods only when problems 
there threatened white families and their homes. While the municipal survey 
recommended improving black housing conditions as a first step toward bettering 
the city, support for that suggestion did not stem from a general concern for the 
welfare of black residents. Rather, support emerged from the fear among white 
residents that unsanitary conditions in black neighborhoods could spread disease 
into their homes, as the report menacingly described: “The family wash sent to 
the negro laundress dries over the filth of a back yard, which may have several 
yard toilets, a good-sized garbage heap, and an open pump in close proximity. 
Conditions such as these must be entirely eliminated from every part of the city 
before the danger of epidemic and disease can be controlled.”21
Poor housing conditions for Newport News’ black residents differed little 
from conditions found in other southern cities. Douglas L. Smith summarizes 
federal studies from the late 1930s in The New Deal in the Urban South, finding 
that between 40 percent and 60 percent of city-dwelling southern blacks lived in 
substandard housing as compared to between 14 percent and 22 percent of city- 
dwelling southern whites. In Atlanta, one-third of black homes were deemed unfit
20
for occupancy. In New Orleans, blacks occupied two-thirds of the city’s slum 
dwellings. In Birmingham, slum neighborhoods took up just 10 percent of the 
city’s total area, but they housed half of the black population. Like others in the 
South, most Newport News black families could relate to the Arkansas boyhood 
home described by author Richard Wright in The Ethics o f Living Jim Crow: An 
Autobiographical Sketch: “Our house stood behind the railroad tracks. Its skimpy 
yard was paved with black cinders. Nothing green ever grew in that yard. The 
only touch of green we could see was far away, beyond the tracks, over where 
the white folks lived.”22
Slum dwellings were still common in many of Newport News’ black 
neighborhoods two decades after the 1919 municipal survey called for improving 
substandard housing. For example, the report had recommended new sewers in 
black neighborhoods, but city officials ignored enforcement of a sewer 
connection ordinance, particularly in black areas, throughout most of the 1930s 
because property owners, who were mostly white, said they could not afford to 
pay the connection fee until the nation’s depression eased. In October 1938, the 
City Council asked twelve faculty members from Huntington High School, the 
city’s secondary school for black students, to examine living conditions in six to 
eight blocks of the city’s worst slum district. Lutrelle F. Palmer, the high school’s 
prominent black principal, headed the volunteer team. A Mississippi native, 
Palmer arrived in Newport News in 1920 and established himself as a community 
leader in the intervening years. He served on the Peninsula Interracial 
Committee and the Aberdeen Gardens sponsoring committee, and he headed
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the Virginia Teachers Association, the statewide organization representing black 
schoolteachers. In an April 1938 interview with the Daily Press, Palmer said 
hundreds of houses in slum areas had no indoor toilets, and many also lacked 
outdoor privies. He said residents used newspapers to cover falling plaster and 
to block wind and rain from blowing into apartments. Submitted in December 
1938, the faculty report repeated many of the findings listed nearly twenty years 
earlier by The Better Newport News Association. It described dangerous 
overcrowding among poverty-stricken families where, “A fire would not only wipe 
out most of the houses and destroy these people’s belongings, but persons living 
in the upstairs apartments would be easily trapped if a fire got headway 
downstairs.” The findings prompted the City Council to create a housing authority 
charged with spending federal dollars to raze decrepit houses and to build new 
ones.23
Palmer and the housing authority symbolize, much like Swantown and 
Aberdeen Gardens, how the promised help offered by New Deal policies typically 
eluded southern blacks, even when they made noteworthy gains. Palmer told a 
Daily Press reporter in April 1938 that the two housing projects showed that black 
families wanted and would care for good housing if given the opportunity to leave 
the slums. By the time Palmer submitted the slum survey eight months later, 
white families had replaced black families in Swantown, and black families 
hesitated to move into Aberdeen Gardens amid uncertainty about its future. The 
creation of a housing authority seemed a blessing to black residents in 1938, but 
they would complain decades later that city officials used the authority’s powers
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only to demolish dilapidated buildings, not to build new houses, often forcing 
black families to leave the city. Palmer himself battled discrimination on another 
front, spearheading the Virginia Teachers Association as it cooperated with 
lawyers affiliated with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People in the statewide pursuit of equal pay for black teachers. The bitterest 
lawsuit occurred in Newport News, where the School Board refused for more 
than two years to comply with a court order issued in January 1943 to equalize 
teachers’ salaries. Compliance came only after the School Board was held in 
contempt of court. In May 1943, Palmer was fired from his job along with two 
other black principals and three black teachers active in the salary-equalization 
movement. Palmer had worked in the school system for twenty-three years.24
CHAPTER II 
SWANTOWN: Moving In
Two Philadelphia contractors, M. Alexander Laverty and Donald M. Love, 
filed a plat map in the Warwick County courthouse in June 1935 for a forty-one- 
unit subdivision called Swantown. Laverty and Love were principal partners in 
Southern Homes, a Richmond-based contracting firm established specifically to 
build Swantown. Laverty was president and majority shareholder. Love was 
treasurer and construction supervisor. The subdivision was located just outside 
Newport News city limits at the crossroads of newly built State Highway 168 and 
Martin's Hundred. It was about one mile north of North Newport News, a small 
neighborhood of black families, and about one mile east of Hilton Village, the 
nation’s first planned urban development, which had been built in 1918 with 
federal dollars for white shipyard workers. Swantown took its name from the 
Swann family, an extended black family that reportedly once owned the land and 
lived nearby along the railroad tracks opposite Hilton Village.25
Two key players ensured Swantown’s construction — shipyard president 
Ferguson and the Federal Housing Administration. Ferguson and Laverty were 
friends (as Love later alleged in a bankruptcy lawsuit), and Ferguson asked 
Laverty to build the houses. Ferguson served as president of the Newport News 
Land Corporation, which sold the subdivision’s twenty acres of undeveloped land 
to Southern Homes for $2,750. Shipyard executives had formed the land
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company in 1921 to buy Hilton Village from the federal government and later 
resold the houses to white shipyard workers. Ferguson also served as president 
of the First National Back of Newport News, which issued promissory notes 
backing Southern Homes’ land purchase and issued mortgages to black 
homebuyers. Samuel H. Plummer, who succeeded Ferguson as bank president, 
and Fred H. Skinner, a Newport News lawyer and Ferguson’s brother-in-law, 
served as trustees for the mortgages. The shipyard also ensured a large pool of 
potential homebuyers. A 1935 community directory shows that the majority of 
Swantown’s future tenants worked in the shipyard and moved to Warwick County 
from Newport News.26
The Federal Housing Administration made twenty-year mortgages to 
Southern Homes and black homebuyers financially feasible by insuring 80 
percent of each $2,000 mortgage, protecting the First National Bank from total 
financial loss should foreclosure occur. Created by the National Housing Act of 
1934, the FHA emerged from the failure of two earlier housing programs — 
President Herbert Hoover’s Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and 
Roosevelt’s Home Owners Loan Corporation — to restore a free-falling real 
estate market. An average of one thousand foreclosures occurred daily 
nationwide in 1933, and half of the nation’s twenty billion dollars of national 
mortgage debt was in default. The FHA sought to jumpstart the stagnant housing 
industry by insuring mortgages, thereby giving risk protection to skittish financial 
institutions that hesitated to approve loans because of high foreclosure rates.
The agency also made home-improvement loans. The FHA provided quality
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controls by requiring developers nationwide to conform to its property and 
construction standards. It made mortgages easier to repay by issuing long-term 
loans with locked low-interest rates. At a time when the typical mortgage was 
paid over twelve years, about 70 percent of FHA mortgages in 1935 allowed 
homebuyers between seventeen years and twenty years to repay their loans. 
Historian Gail Radford calls the FHA “the most important of several Depression- 
era federal agencies aimed at pumping life back into the housing market by 
restructuring its financial underpinnings.” Housing starts rebounded in 1934 for 
the first time in eight years, and they continued to climb until World War II. The 
FHA insured $4.4 billion worth of mortgages between 1934 and 1940, 
guaranteeing loans for four of every ten houses built in urban areas in 1940 
alone.27
However, black homebuyers benefited little from an agency that routinely 
discriminated against African Americans and advocated racially homogeneous 
neighborhoods into the 1960s. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported 
that the FHA insured mortgages on 2,761,172 housing units between 1935 and 
1950, but blacks occupied only fifty thousand units — or about 2 percent of the 
total — in strictly segregated neighborhoods found mostly in the South. (Half of 
the black-occupied units were built during World War II for defense workers.) 
This happened during a fifteen-year time period when the FHA insured 30 
percent of all new construction. As economist Robert C. Weaver wrote in 1948, 
“FHA’s chief contribution to Negroes was to complicate the ultimate solution of 
their housing problem.”28
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The prevalence of lily-white suburbs ringing older cities stemmed, in part, 
from the residential segregation propagated by FHA administrators with ties to 
private-sector banking and real-estate interests. Most homebuilding occurred on 
undeveloped land outside city limits, and most mortgages went to white 
homebuyers. Agency officials turned to the FHA’s Underwriting Manual when 
determining whether a single house or a proposed subdivision satisfied lending 
criteria. During the FHA’s first sixteen years, the manual advocated the use of 
racially restrictive covenants, which were legal clauses in deeds that prohibited 
the sale of houses to minorities. The manual also allowed agency officials to 
deny mortgage insurance if they concluded a project undermined a 
neighborhood’s stability by mingling “inharmonious racial groups.”29
In conflict after conflict, “inharmonious” came to mean anything that upset 
white homebuilding, banking and real estate interests. Weaver reported that a 
Los Angeles builder and a leading city bank wanted to build housing for black 
tenants during World War II, but a FHA underwriter pulled the agency’s support 
after nearby white property owners complained. The underwriter argued that 
surrounding properties were bound by racial covenants, which made the project 
incompatible with the area. That underwriter later refused to alter his decision, 
even after he was shown real estate records that proved the properties carried 
no such covenants. FHA officials also rejected an application to build wartime 
housing in Chester, Pennsylvania, for black shipyard workers. The project’s 
backers submitted four possible housing locations. Three sites either abutted or 
included slum areas occupied by blacks, which disqualified them for financial
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backing. A FHA official rejected the fourth and most suitable site because it 
lacked existing utilities, schools and transportation. Weaver argued that agency 
officials could have raised such objections on most FHA-approved projects, and 
he alleged that a leading financial institution that wanted to build a nearby whites- 
only housing project pressured the FHA to reject the application. The FHA 
inflamed already tender race relations in Detroit in the early 1940s, for example, 
when it stopped insuring mortgages for homebuyers that moved into 
neighborhoods near a federally sponsored public-housing project being built for 
black tenants. Ultimately, controversy about the public-housing project sparked 
two race riots, prompting one prominent social worker to blame the FHA for 
providing the economic impetus for the clashes.30
FHA administrators gave two ready excuses for their discriminatory 
actions — local race relations and income levels. The “neighborhood composition 
guideline” followed by FHA administrators prohibited them from selecting buyers 
or tenants that altered established racial patterns. Advocacy of continued 
residential segregation imposed income-related handicaps on black homebuyers 
by confining them to marginal or blighted neighborhoods where neither the FHA 
nor local lending institutions would invest. This occurred at a time when the 
typical black family earned roughly one-third of the annual income earned by 
white families in small southern cities like Newport News. FHA administrators 
prided themselves on a low foreclosure rate, which was maintained by following 
the conventional lending practices of private financial institutions. They often 
refused to approve mortgages for black applicants by concluding that the
28
prospective homebuyers did not make enough money to justify receiving a 
mortgage.31
Agency administrators routinely denied discrimination when pressed by 
black leaders. M.R. Young, FHA executive secretary, responded to a letter from 
Roy Wilkins, the NAACP’s assistant secretary, that questioned the lack of 
federally-insured mortgages for black homebuyers by writing that, “While it may 
be true that many Negroes and many neighborhoods can not meet our required 
standards, it is also unfortunately true that the same condition exists among 
people of many other races and the neighborhoods in which they live.” Young 
made such a claim even though earlier in the letter he remarked that he could not 
tell Wilkins how many FHA mortgages blacks had received because “we do not 
even keep our records on a racial basis.” Such empty denials did little more than 
obfuscate the existence of the FHA’s pervading institutional racism.32
Even so, Swantown offered a tremendous opportunity, giving forty-one 
black families a chance to rent or own a brand new house. Nationwide, only 
about 23 percent of blacks owned the houses they occupied in 1940, compared 
to about 46 percent of whites. In Newport News, homeownership rates by race 
were 21 percent and 37 percent, respectively. A Daily Press article indirectly 
attributed low homeownership rates to a virtual cease to home construction 
throughout the 1930s, which created a shortage of suitable homes. Real estate 
agents estimated that only between 3 percent and 5 percent of houses were 
vacant. Newport News’ housing crunch worsened as World War II approached, 
and the country’s military buildup triggered more work at the shipyard, which
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employed almost 10,000 workers in 1939. The housing shortage and the military 
buildup at least partially explain the particularly low homeownership rate among 
the city’s white residents compared to the nationwide average.33
Built on one-quarter acre lots, Swantown’s stucco houses came in two 
styles — two story or bungalow — and featured three bedrooms, a living room 
with a fireplace, linoleum floors and indoor plumbing. Southern Homes told the 
Daily Press that a homebuyer could pay a portion of the $400 down payment by 
working 180 hours to earn $90, which was deducted from the down payment and 
was used to furnish the house with items such as furniture, curtains, bed sheets, 
towels and cooking utensils. Homebuyers could then work more to further reduce 
the down payment or pay $310 in cash. The newspaper reported that 
homebuyers’ relatives helped to build houses if work at the shipyard prevented 
the buyer from participating. In one instance, three sons built a house for their 
parents. Federal and local officials claimed the houses, which sold for $2,400, 
could have sold for $3,500 on the open market. New homeowners swelled with 
pride. Langston Powell, who was the four-year-old son of shipyard laborer John 
Powell and his wife Rosa, recalls few details today about living in Swantown, but 
he remembers longing to “get back uptown” to brag to friends about his new 
home. “We felt like we were really somebody who was worth something,” Powell 
said. “You weren’t renting. You were buying. That was a big deal to our father.”34
30
Swantown: Moving Out
Swantown began to unravel about one year after construction started and 
just four months after First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt toured the black 
neighborhood, telling reporters in April 1936 that, “I hope to return sometime and 
see the extent to which the resettlement projects here have consummated their 
development.” Five prominent white residents, including a truck farmer, two 
storekeepers and a funeral home operator, filed a public nuisance complaint in 
August in Warwick County Circuit Court against the FHA, Southern Homes and 
black tenants. Only one complainant, farmer Stephen R. Maney, owned property 
that bordered Swantown. (Some Warwick County residents contended that 
Southern Homes failed to heed informal segregation boundaries when building 
Swantown. C.M. Elvin, of Morrison, asked the Daily Press, “What is Newport 
News going to do about the white property owners whose property was wantonly 
depreciated by the settlement being built in a supposedly white restricted district? 
Why did it have to be put in a community of white residents anyhow?”) The 
complaint alleged that human sewage overflowed from undersized septic tanks 
into Newmarket Creek, eventually flowing into a ditch that carried the sewage 
into lakes at a public park and then into the James River. The five county 
residents blamed Southern Homes for installing septic tanks smaller than those 
mandated by county zoning law, the FHA for financing mortgages to houses with 
inadequate septic tanks and the forty-one tenants for flushing their toilets. The 
complaint tapped a deep-seated fear among southern whites by raising the 
specter of an epidemic sparked by blacks, whom doctors into the twentieth
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century often described as more disease-prone than whites because of inherent 
inferior racial traits. As late as the mid-1930s, the Journal and Guide attempted to 
refute such unscientific beliefs by reporting on medical studies that showed no 
difference in the susceptibility of blacks and whites to tuberculosis and by urging 
city leaders to reduce the risk of disease in black neighborhoods by giving black 
residents equitable access to health and sanitation services used by white 
residents.35
A grand jury indicted the defendants a month later, touching off nearly a 
year’s worth of negotiations involving officials from the FHA, Southern Homes, 
Warwick County, Newport News, state highway department and Maney. The 
talks proved fruitless. Bankruptcy proceedings began against Southern Homes 
less than two weeks before the trial started. The company owed more than 
$40,000 to creditors, and it possessed virtually no assets. That outstanding debt 
might explain why the company pulled out of an agreed-upon remedy just before 
the trial. The solution called for Southern Homes to fix the septic tanks after the 
highway department agreed to reroute its ditches, and Maney agreed to grant a 
right-of-way over his land to accommodate the changes.36
The weeklong trial began in May 1937 with Judge Frank Armistead 
amending the indictment by dropping the FHA from the lawsuit apparently 
because the agency was not directly involved with Swantown’s construction. The 
judge told jurors they could acquit Southern Homes and the black tenants if they 
faulted the state highway department for not properly maintaining ditches on 
State Highway 168, causing water to back into Swantown’s ditches and flood the
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sewage system. Also, jurors could not blame Southern Homes for violating 
county zoning law since the county Board of Supervisors did not pass a law 
regulating the size of septic tanks until about eight months after Southern Homes 
began construction. The jury deliberated for four hours. It found Southern Homes 
and construction supervisor Love guilty and fined them $1,000 and $500, 
respectively. The jury also found thirty-eight black tenants guilty, fining them a 
penny apiece. In his ruling, Armistead wrote that the homebuyers and renters 
were “only technically guilty and are the victims and are the victims of 
circumstance.” The judge reportedly paid their fines.37
One week later, Armistead issued an eviction order that required 
Swantown’s tenants to leave their homes by the day after Independence Day 
unless the sewage problem was fixed. A Journal and Guide reporter visited 
Swantown soon afterward. Thirteen families had already left, including four 
whose houses sold at a foreclosure sale. Neighbors said those four families 
could afford their monthly house payments, but they decided to stop paying when 
Southern Homes failed to fix the septic tanks and make other repairs. Residents 
complained about shoddy houses with leaky roofs and hollow walls. They 
claimed that Southern Homes officials had promised to fix the septic tanks if 
tenants agreed to pay about half of the $16,000 price tag. The residents paid, but 
Southern Homes made no repairs.38
Complications bogged renewed negotiations to fix the sewage problem. 
Between the tenants’ convictions and evictions, Maney and federal officials could 
not reach a right-of-way agreement. Plans called for two new ditches across
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Maney’s land — one to drain State Highway 168 and one to drain Swantown. 
Maney preferred one ditch. Abner H. Ferguson, acting FHA administrator and 
general counsel, promised publicly to “make every effort to relieve the present 
unsatisfactory conditions at Swantown and avoid eviction of present occupants,” 
but he cautioned that his agency could provide no direct help until the houses 
went into foreclosure. “Out of a total of about $825 million of mortgages which the 
administration has accepted for insurance,” Ferguson said, “the Swantown 
project is the only one that is in real difficulty.” The FHA foreclosed on eighty- 
eight houses in 1937, and thirty-eight of them were in Swantown.39
Evictions occurred as scheduled. A later court order allowed five families 
to stay beyond the deadline while they looked for housing elsewhere. The 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a government-lending bank, eventually 
bought the houses for the FHA at foreclosure auctions. The FHA paid less than 
$2,000 to 208 defaulting homeowners nationwide in 1938. That figure coupled 
with local financial tallies following the foreclosures indicate that Swantown’s 
homeowners most assuredly lost the money they invested in their houses. In 
March 1938, Maney agreed to sell an easement over his property for $850. He 
allowed two ditches on his property, and it is possible that this was the same 
remedy he had rejected months earlier when black families still lived in 
Swantown. The FHA began nearly $40,000 worth of renovations soon afterward. 
The last black homeowners, Charles and Susie Gayle, moved out in August 
1938. The couple had replaced their septic tank and had continued to pay their
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mortgage. They swapped their house in Swantown for one in Aberdeen 
Gardens.40
Swantown’s swan song officially came in September 1938 when two 
leading Newport News real estate firms — Murray & Padgett and Hundley & 
Applewhite — announced they would sell the renovated houses to white 
homebuyers only. They also changed the subdivision’s name to Warwick Village. 
The firms had close ties to the FHA and First National Bank of Newport News. 
Realtor Ambrose A. Padgett headed a local committee created in April 1938 by 
the FHA with hopes of melding local business interests with federal housing 
aims. Thomas J. Hundley and Archer A. Applewhite served on the board of the 
Warwick Land Company with Samuel H. Plummer, bank president and trustee for 
Swantown’s mortgages. Hundley was married to one of Plummer’s sisters. The 
views of these men likely carried significant weight in deciding to convert 
Swantown to white occupancy. The FHA’s Ferguson had earlier told a 
congressional committee that the agency conferred with its state director, local 
lenders, and local real-estate agents when deciding how to dispose of foreclosed 
properties.41
The racial conversion was an economic success in an area with a tight 
housing market. The houses sold in three days. Billed as Newport News’ newest 
suburb, Warwick Village houses sold at a starting price of $2,000, with an
acceptable down payment of 10 percent. The FHA once again insured
/
mortgages issued by the First National Bank. Property records show that twenty- 
two homebuyers took out mortgages worth $1,800. Assuming 10 percent down,
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that means they paid less than black homebuyers did before renovations. Many 
of Swantown’s former tenants moved back to Newport News. A handful moved 
into Aberdeen Gardens, another controversial segregated housing project built 
by the federal government on the Virginia Peninsula.42
CHAPTER III 
ABERDEEN GARDENS: Opportunity
Harold L. Ickes, U.S. Secretary of the Interior, set aside $245,000 in 
March 1935 for the Newport News Homesteads (later renamed Aberdeen 
Gardens) through the Division of Subsistence Homesteads after more than a 
year’s worth of planning. The project was backed by Hampton Institute, a 
sponsoring committee of black community leaders, and with endorsements from 
leading white Newport News and Hampton officials. Ickes expected the money to 
buy two hundred acres about 2.5 miles outside of Newport News in Elizabeth 
City County and to build one hundred houses for struggling black families. 
Ultimately, the federal government built 158 houses at a cost of more than $1.3 
million. Plans called for three-, four- and five-room brick houses. Tenants could 
eventually become homeowners over twenty to thirty years, but they would 
initially rent their homes and then have the option to make mortgage payments or 
rent-to-own. Plans called for the construction of an entire community, including a 
park, playgrounds, community center and a cooperative store to be organized 
and operated by tenants. Each house would come with a garden, orchard, 
chickens and pigs. Tenants would share twelve mules and twelve milking cows.43
Federal officials hoped Newport News Homesteads, called a subsistence 
homestead project, would lift low-income black tenants “to a higher social and 
health level” and give them “a new economic stability” by offering them good
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housing at a reasonable price and enough land to grow gardens that could 
provide food more cheaply than grocery stores. Officials justified the project by 
citing a survey of two hundred black families in Newport News. The survey found 
that the average weekly income for black workers in Newport News had dropped 
by $6 to $14 per week. Many black laborers worked only two or three times a 
week, but they paid high rents to live in substandard houses that were at least a 
half-mile from garden plots. Black residents seemed to embrace the federal 
project, with a waiting list of applicants doubling the number of proposed houses. 
William Peddrew, a Newport News plumber and Hampton Institute graduate, 
praised the project when his family was one of the first ten to move into a house 
in November 1937. “It was impossible for me to have a garden and to raise 
chickens where I was. Besides, we look forward to better living standards in our 
own home, and we are not so crowded here.”44
Aberdeen Gardens was an exceptional project in two ways. First, no other 
suburban resettlement project was built for blacks during the New Deal, despite 
plans for others. Second, Aberdeen Gardens boasted careful design, planning 
and construction by black architects, engineers and laborers. “This project 
derives one of its most significant features from the fact that it is a project by 
Negroes, for Negroes ... I have every confidence that the future history of the 
Newport News project will be a record of achievement and advancement by 
members of our colored population,” said Charles E. Pynchon, general manager 
of the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation. Hillyard Robertson, a black 
architect from Howard University, was the project’s top designer. Black engineers
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oversaw construction by a black work crew from the Work Projects 
Administration. The project’s community manager, William R. Walker Jr., was the 
only black supervisor to run a New Deal homestead without white oversight. 
While Swantown tenants lived on streets named after Confederate officers, 
Aberdeen Gardens residents lived on streets named after prominent deceased 
black Virginians, such as Maggie Walker, a Richmond businesswoman, and Matt 
N. Lewis, founding publisher of the Newport News Star. Extensive black 
involvement in conceiving and supervising the project did not escape local 
criticism. An August 1936 editorial in the Daily Press scoffed at the project’s 
black management. “There were 376 Negroes at work yesterday, to say nothing 
of the one who strutted a badge bearing the label ‘Special Officer.’ ”45
Despite such racially charged claims, support for black involvement traced 
back to Aberdeen Gardens’ two main sponsors, which — like Swantown — 
included a prominent local institution and a federal agency. Hampton Institute, 
guided by the leadership of Arthur Howe, school president, and William M. 
Cooper, director of extension education, exerted a steadying local influence 
when uncertainty surrounded Aberdeen Gardens as succeeding federal agencies 
planned and re-planned the project during its formative years. Founded in 1868, 
the Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute, which was renamed Hampton 
Institute in 1930, taught classes in reading, writing and arithmetic to young black 
men and women, while it also prepared them for jobs as teachers, farmers, 
clerks and skilled tradesmen. Union General Samuel Chapman Armstrong, the 
institute’s first president, defined the school’s mission when he said, “The thing to
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be done was clear — to train selected Negro youths who should go out and 
teach and lead their people, first by example, by getting land and homes; to give 
them not a dollar that they could earn for themselves; to teach respect for labor, 
to replace stupid drudgery with skilled hands, and in this way to build up an 
industrial system for the sake, not only of self-support and intelligent labor, but 
also for the sake of character.” The school evolved over the decades, offering its 
first bachelor degree in agricultural education in 1923, receiving formal 
accreditation as a standard technical and professional college in 1927 and 
awarding its first masters degree in education in 1934. According to The Negro in 
Virginia, most students enrolled in the School of Education during the 1930s, 
specializing in mathematics, English, French, physical education, science, social 
studies or public school music. Other students enrolled in the Department of 
Agriculture, which readied them for farming, teaching or extension work, or they 
enrolled in the Trade School, which taught such skills as carpentry, welding, 
plumbing and printing. Hampton Institute’s mission echoed the economic 
progress, black self-help and interracial cooperation espoused by its most 
famous graduate, Booker T. Washington, in his Atlanta Compromise. Virginia’s 
white elites frequently praised Hampton Institute, seeing its mission as a logical 
extension of their exaggerated sense of paternalism. Such beliefs obscured 
Hampton Institute’s role, through such controversies as the Massenburg Law and 
Aberdeen Gardens, in gradually eroding Virginia’s system of managed race 
relations.46
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Home construction seems a natural fit for Hampton Institute during the 
1930s given the respect other African Americans held for black college 
graduates, who tended to subscribe to the ideology that all blacks, regardless of 
class distinctions, deserved equal access in all areas. At a time when most black 
students never finished high school, a college graduate was held in particularly 
high esteem. College graduates often became leaders in the black community 
because their careers as teachers, doctors, lawyers and ministers reinforced 
their assumed position of leadership with actual civic involvement. Henry Louis 
Taylor Jr. and Song-Ho Ha argue that the crucible of industrial urban living and 
racial discrimination created a racial consciousness that encouraged African 
Americans “to think and act as a people with a common history and destiny, 
despite being fractured along class and gender lines, and spatially dispersed.” 
This led to what Preston H. Smith II calls “social democracy,” the dominant belief 
among black intellectuals during the Great Depression “that all individuals 
regardless of class should have equal enjoyment of all essential social goods.” 
Thus, Aberdeen Gardens matched three forces within the Peninsula’s black 
community that did not always align: the ideological interests of the educated 
elite, who served as the project’s sponsors; Hampton Institute’s mission of 
practical self-help and economic advancement; and, the goal of homeownership 
held by black workers who often lived in the area’s most dilapidated rental 
housing. With local support established for a project like Aberdeen Gardens, 
organizers now needed a prospective funding source.47
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A series of government agencies provided federal support and dollars for 
Aberdeen Gardens. Tucked into the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 
New Deal legislation that sought to stimulate economic revival by establishing 
business codes of fair competition that effectively fixed prices and wages, was an 
obscure section that set aside $25 million for “subsistence homesteads.” The 
money went to Ickes at the Department of Interior, who created the Division of 
Subsistence Homesteads in the late summer of 1933. Federal officials were in 
contact with Howe at Hampton Institute by October. Historian Sidney Baldwin 
says New Dealers tapped “three historical streams of thought” when conceiving 
the subsistence homesteads program. They drew upon Jeffersonian visions of 
agrarian independence, the back-to-the-land movement of the nineteenth 
century, and American traditions of sectarian communal living, such as the 
religious colonies founded by the Shakers. Federal officials decided to create 
four types of communities — experimental farm colonies, homesteads for 
stranded industrial workers, garden homes for industrial workers near existing 
cities, and homesteads for part-time industrial workers. The homestead projects 
mixed the practical concern of affordable and adequate housing with liberal 
social engineering aimed at bettering the lives of the poor. By June 1934, thirty of 
the thirty-two projects to be completed were planned. The two not yet on the 
drawing board were both in Virginia — the controversial Shenandoah 
Homesteads, which built houses for mountain farmers pushed off their land for 
the creation of the Shenandoah National Park, and Aberdeen Gardens, which 
was drafted in March 1935.48
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The newly created Resettlement Administration absorbed the Division of 
Subsistence Homesteads just two months after federal officials announced plans 
for Aberdeen Gardens. The Resettlement Administration also consolidated the 
land-use programs of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, farm-debt 
adjustment program managed by the Farm Credit Administration and rural 
rehabilitation projects undertaken by the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration. Resettlement projects inherited by the massive new agency were 
still in their infancy and were of far less importance, according to Tindall, than the 
agency’s efforts to encourage land-use planning, remove submarginal land from 
agricultural production and award rural rehabilitation loans and grants for land 
and farming equipment purchases. The Resettlement Administration completed 
ninety-nine resettlement communities —  sixty-one of them in the South — before 
the Farm Security Administration absorbed it in September 1937.49
Uncertainty stalked Aberdeen Gardens from initial planning through 
construction. Howe originally wanted the project built closer to Hampton, but 
sponsors could not find enough qualified black tenants to support construction. 
Sponsors struggled to find a suitable tract of land at an affordable price near 
Newport News, and they eventually settled for property farther from the city than 
initially intended. The size of the project fluctuated greatly, going from ten houses 
to twenty-five to fifty to one hundred during early planning. Howe wrote worried 
letters to top federal officials in September 1935, seeking assurances that the 
new Resettlement Administration intended to complete the project. Greater 
pitfalls awaited once construction began.50
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Aberdeen Gardens: Challenge
Local complaints about Aberdeen Gardens surfaced publicly in February 
1937, several years after initial planning and about one year after workers had 
cleared trees for construction. A Daily Press article reported that the Virginia 
Peninsula Association of Commerce, essentially a regional chamber of 
commerce, had passed a resolution that asked federal and state officials to 
convert Aberdeen Gardens into a white-occupancy project since white farmers 
surrounded the property. Four days later, the Daily Press published a second 
article correcting the initial report. Sherrod N. Vaughn, PAC secretary-manager, 
said the group had passed a resolution that asked federal officials only to study 
whether Aberdeen Gardens should convert to white occupancy. Vaughn also 
said a PAC committee would review plans for Aberdeen Gardens before the 
group decided whether to take further action.51
Supporters quickly rallied around the project. Lorenzo C. White, of 
Hampton Institute, sent a letter to the Daily Press, writing that converting the 
project could discourage future interracial cooperation. He asked what prevented 
whites from forcing “all Negroes or all Jews or all red-headed people” off the 
Peninsula and out of Virginia if they succeeded in altering Aberdeen Gardens. 
T he  resolution seemed to show that the P.A.C. was dead set on shattering the 
hopes of the many struggling Negro families who have come to think of 
Aberdeen as their first opportunity to escape from slum conditions.” The black 
press did not accept the corrected news report at face value. The Journal and 
Guide pointed out that the correction ran four days after the original story, even
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though Raymond B. Bottom was both Daily Press publisher and PAC president. 
The Journal and Guide suspected that the real reason for the correction 
stemmed from white real-estate agents who worried that a whites-only Aberdeen 
Gardens would siphon prospective clients and possible profits.52
Unlike Swantown, Aberdeen Gardens had strong support in Washington, 
D.C. Liberals considered friendly to African American interests headed the 
Resettlement Administration, even though — like officials at other federal 
agencies — they usually adhered to established discriminatory and 
segregationist policies. Will W. Alexander was named administrator of the 
Resettlement Administration in January 1937 when the agency was transferred 
to the Department of Agriculture. The son of an Ozark farmer, Alexander had 
served as president of Dillard University, a black college in New Orleans, and he 
had headed the Commission on Interracial Cooperation in Atlanta for twenty-five 
years. The Resettlement Administration, especially under Alexander’s leadership, 
displayed real concern for southern blacks by insuring rehabilitation loans, which 
was the agency’s main function, roughly proportional to their numbers as 
farmers. (The figures do not compare as favorably when looking solely at low- 
income farmers, which was the group most directly aided by those loans.) “That 
the racial discrepancy is not greater is the result of pressure exerted by the 
Washington and regional offices on the local offices to grant loans to needy 
farmers irrespective of color,” Richard Sterner observed. Unlike the FHA, the 
Resettlement Administration employed an advisor for black affairs, Joseph H.B. 
Evans, who rebuffed the PAC resolution. “The thing is too absurd to even
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discuss,” Evans told the Journal and Guide. “That project was planned by 
Negroes, engineered by Negroes and is being built by Negroes and will be 
occupied by Negro tenants. Make no mistake about that.”53
Noteworthy strides for equality, though, did not exist to the same extent on 
the agency’s resettlement homesteads as they did in the loan program, perhaps 
partially explaining why federal officials refused to convert Aberdeen Gardens to 
white occupancy. Federal officials had planned Aberdeen Gardens in 1935 at a 
time when none of thirty-one projects under construction accepted black tenants. 
By 1940, 1,393 black families lived on thirty-two homestead projects, including 
smaller scattered farm sites, in thirteen southern states. Those families 
accounted for about 25 percent of all tenants living on government homesteads 
when black families made up about 37 percent of all low-income farm families. 
Aberdeen Gardens was unique because it was the largest project, and it was 
located in a border state. Only five other projects — one each in Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina and South Carolina — planned for more than 
100 houses. Of the 32 projects, only four were planned for border states — one 
each in Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri.54
Localized racism prevented many black families across the nation from 
moving into planned homestead projects. More than two hundred black residents 
applied to live in a project built in Arthurdale, West Virginia, but the community 
manager refused to consider their applications, saying that only “native white 
stock” could live there. Petitions signed by 1,100 white residents from three 
townships halted plans to build a black project in Dayton, Ohio. White residents
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blocked efforts to find a suitable location for a black-occupied homestead in 
Indianapolis, forcing officials to abandon their plans.55
In some situations, federal officials only partially heeded protests from 
neighboring whites. They proceeded with plans to build black-occupied 
homesteads, but they separated the houses from nearby white-owned farms by 
preserving an undeveloped tract of land between black and white properties. 
Such a “greenbelt” was created at Aberdeen Gardens. The PAC committee 
recommended in March 1937 that Aberdeen Gardens remain a black-occupied 
project since so much work had already occurred, but it also urged federal 
officials to not extend the project beyond its existing boundaries. The committee 
criticized the Resettlement Administration for inflaming local race relations by 
ignoring earlier white protests and even accused the agency of ignoring concerns 
among black leaders anxious about building black-occupied houses so near 
white farms. The association’s board of directors unanimously endorsed the 
report, and board president Bottom mailed it to Alexander in Washington, D.C. In 
an accompanying letter, Bottom wrote that, “We feel your office recognizes the 
need that no Federal project fly in the face of local sentiment.” Howe expressed 
his surprise at several of the committee’s findings in marginalia on his copy of the 
report. He doubted that black leaders had concerns about neighboring white 
farms, noted that the first white protests occurred one month earlier, and he 
wondered how close many of the protesters actually lived to the project.
However, Howe supported the report’s recommendation since it did not alter 
existing plans and seemingly quelled protest. “Believe something along lines
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indicated wiil be best for all concerned,” he wrote. The Resettlement 
Administration followed the report’s recommendation. To avoid future 
controversy, Howe and the all-black sponsoring committee created an interracial 
advisory committee for the purpose of improving public relations and keeping the 
general public better informed about plans for Aberdeen Gardens.56
The second public challenge to confront Aberdeen Gardens attacked the 
project indirectly, but it foreshadowed the federal government’s abandonment of 
resettlement projects in the 1940s. Homestead projects had long drawn the ire of 
conservative congressmen who criticized their exorbitant costs and compared 
them to Soviet-style collectives. Senator Byrd attacked the Resettlement 
Administration in July 1937 from his perch atop the senate reorganization 
committee for “sinful and absurd waste” of taxpayer dollars. Byrd focused his 
opposition primarily on the Shenandoah Homesteads, which was built in the 
same part of Virginia as his hometown, but he took broad swipes at all 
homestead projects. Figures pulled together for Byrd’s committee estimated that 
the houses at Aberdeen Gardens cost $9,233 apiece. The estimate prompted 
many critical editorials from the Daily Press decrying Aberdeen Gardens as an 
extravagant waste of money and questioning the project’s future. Such criticism 
resulted in little immediate change in the nation’s capital, but it seemingly 
dampened already dwindling interest regarding Aberdeen Gardens among local 
black residents. Sponsors struggled to find additional tenants as the first ten 
families moved into the project in November 1937. Many black families wondered 
whether charges of financial waste at Aberdeen Gardens, coming after efforts to
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convert it to white occupancy, could result in it becoming another Swantown, 
which sat mostly empty at the time. Aberdeen Gardens remained about one-fifth 
vacant in June 1940. Ultimately, the Federal Public Housing Authority assumed 
responsibility for Aberdeen Gardens. It sold most of the houses between 1946 
and 1948, mostly to its black renters, including five former Swantown residents. 
Only then — about ten years after construction started — could Aberdeen 
Gardens’ black tenants feel truly secure in their homes.57
CHAPTER IV 
“THOSE WHO CAME IN FROM THE OUTSIDE...”
A Daily Press editorial published in September 1937 perhaps best stated 
why Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens encountered opposition from white 
residents. The editorial renewed the newspaper’s criticism of Aberdeen Gardens’ 
expensive houses and tacitly acknowledged the chilling effect of Swantown’s 
conversion to white occupancy. “In the unfinished state of the project, it cannot 
hope to attract homeowners. The experience of Swantown has been a bitter 
lesson to many.” The editorial derided the federal government for impractical 
planning, poor management, and wasteful spending, speculating that the project 
could become “the greatest white elephant this community has ever possessed.” 
The editorial then explained why such a promising project failed in the eyes of so 
many of the newspaper’s white readers. “Those who came in from the outside, 
who did not know either local conditions or the people with whom they had to 
deal, have not been able to fit their ideas successfully into community life here.”
A more in-depth examination of the reasoning behind why black families wanted 
those houses and why white residents opposed black homeownership helps to 
explain why New Deal housing programs nationwide engendered such 
controversy. In essence, housing projects for black tenants posed challenges to 
existing Jim Crow strictures regarding race, space and class by relocating poor 
black families to areas considered outside their established boundaries, thereby
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threatening the social and economic interests of white residents of all classes 
and eroding Virginia’s brand of race relations managed through benevolent 
paternalism.58
Kenneth L. Kusmer suggests studying black urban history through a basic 
framework that examines the influence and interaction of structural, internal and 
external forces on the black community. Structural forces are overarching, 
nonracial forces, such as a city’s demographic shift or growing industrialization. 
Internal forces describe how blacks seek to influence or are influenced by 
structural and external forces “through the retention or creation of cultural values 
or institutions that are indigenous to the black community.” Internal forces also 
describe black attitudes and behaviors toward whites. External forces represent 
white attitudes and behaviors toward black residents, “particularly to the manner 
in which the behavior of whites impinges upon blacks.” The complex interplay 
between the three forces means none operates independent of the others.59
Kusmer’s framework overlooks a crucial dimension that must also be 
considered when studying black urban history: the power of economic and social 
divisions in shaping interactions among blacks and between blacks and whites. 
Robin D.G. Kelley urges scholars to avoid falling into the trap of viewing the 
“black community” as a singularly focused monolith rather than a fractured 
community with internal competing interests that vary according to occupation 
and income. On the Virginia Peninsula, a common desire for homeownership 
between black leaders and black laborers did not necessarily translate into an 
automatic embrace of Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens. This class division
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displayed itself most noticeably at Aberdeen Gardens where completed houses 
sat vacant, despite assurances from black leaders of white acceptance, because 
black laborers did not want to jeopardize their personal economic standing on a 
project that had assumed the appearance of a risky venture. While legalized 
segregation sought to exaggerate the frequently scant economic differences 
between poor blacks and poor whites in the name of white supremacy, sweeping 
changes across the South were making it more difficult to maintain that facade, 
as evidenced in part by the ability of black families in Newport News to purchase 
their own homes.60
Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens came amid the upheaval of 
urbanization and industrialization as cities throughout the South grew in size and 
economic significance. David Goldfield argues that plummeting crop prices, 
exhausted soil, boll weevils and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration’s 
discouragement of sharecropping practices nearly completed the weaning of the 
South from its agrarian roots in the 1930s. Rural blacks, aided by the growing 
availability of automobiles and electricity, had already shown their opposition to 
the rural South’s suffocating paternalism and poverty by voluntarily moving to 
cities. The 1870 decennial census identified one in six black Virginians as a city- 
dweller. By 1930, one in three black Virginians lived in cities. However, no 
panacea awaited black laborers, even during World War I when the U.S.
Shipping Board reserved jobs and instituted wage controls for black laborers at 
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock. Urban migration loosened the binds 
of rural paternalism, but residential segregation and workplace discrimination
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limited the economic and social opportunities of black city-dwellers alienated 
from family, friends and the familiar pace of rural life. Virginia’s tradition of 
“progressive backwardness” complicated the changes underway by stripping 
cities of the adequate financial resources required to aid the needy and to 
alleviate overcrowding in slum districts.61
The editorial pages of the Journal and Guide consistently advocated 
federal housing programs that promised better housing for black families, 
explaining in general terms why the black community valued homeownership. 
“Home-owning is a fundamental creed of the true American — whether it be a 
shack in shanty town, a boat-house on the river, a cabin in the cotton, or a pent­
house in the metropolis. A nation endures in proportion to the quality of its homes 
and the characters which emerge therefrom.” Historian Earl Lewis argues, in In 
Their Own Interests: Race, Class and Power in Twentieth-Century Norfolk, 
Virginia, that Norfolk blacks changed how they attempted to undermine Jim Crow 
restrictions between 1900 and World War II. Into the early 1930s, black residents 
worked to undermine entrenched Jim Crow restrictions by more often demanding 
greater rights in their homes and neighborhoods rather than at work, where they 
mostly held the worst jobs, earned less pay and were denied promotions. They 
saw opportunities to push for better roads and better housing, but they did not 
see such opportunities for higher pay and better jobs. Lewis argues that the 
Depression began a gradual shift in that balance, encouraging black residents to 
push for improved status equally at the workplace and at home. “For Norfolk’s 
black residents, the issue was more than autonomy — their success in carving
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out some social and psychic space exemplified their determination to achieve 
power in whatever way possible.”62
Newport News’ black residents seem to have generally followed this 
outline of protest, although Lewis somewhat overstates the distinction between 
workplace and home. (For example, the spheres of home and workplace united 
at Swantown since most families appear to have qualified for tenancy based on 
their shipyard employment.) Even so, homeownership was a life-defining goal — 
as the parents of Joyce Brown Wilkins and Langston Powell attested to upon 
moving into Swantown — at a time when only one in four urban blacks owned a 
house. Families at Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens willingly gave up the 
comforts of established black neighborhoods and of readily available 
transportation, either from friends or buses, in order to own a house, to carve out 
their own “social and psychic space” in comfortable, inviting surroundings. 
Dorothy “Dot” Dorsey was eleven years old when her parents, Roger and Annie 
Mae Gayle, rented a house at Swantown. “It was nice up there,” Dorsey said. 
“The only thing was there were no businesses. You had to have a car or walk. 
And we walked.”63
Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens tenants sought to protect their stake in 
their homes. Swantown tenants said neighbors stopped making house payments 
and willingly went into foreclosure to protect what they could of their investment 
after Southern Homes swindled about $8,000 and failed to make needed house 
repairs. Aberdeen Gardens residents petitioned the Farm Security 
Administration, which succeeded the Resettlement Administration, in May 1938
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to change contract language in their leases. They wanted to remove a clause 
that required residents to keep their houses in “good order and repair” since 
typical lease agreements only called for tenants to maintain “reasonable order 
and repair.” Residents also asked for lower rents, the first year’s rent to count 
toward equity in the houses, and the placement of three homesteaders on the 
project’s sponsoring committee.64
Black homeownership challenged Jim Crow inequality in one of the few 
tangible avenues available — through what Grace Elizabeth Hale calls the 
“politics of consumption.” Homeownership allowed black families to assert their 
equality, to define themselves as Americans fulfilling the American dream. 
Urbanization and industrialization created a national mass market that 
encouraged people to identify themselves by what they could buy. The 
increasing dominance of this culture of consumer capitalism catered to individual 
desire and pleasure, giving people at least the appearance of greater freedom 
through their choice of consumer goods, according to William Leach. Legal and 
extra-legal discrimination prevented blacks from attaining equality in jobs and 
education, and segregation confined where blacks lived. However, Jim Crow 
restrictions could not stop black families from buying what they wanted, although 
it made many purchases more difficult by restricting their income. Across the 
South, black men and women could walk into a general store and buy the same 
brand of household goods as white men and women, subverting the ideology of 
white supremacy. Hale writes that, “Few African Americans may have retained 
the vote, but many had something whites wanted, at least a few dollars to spend.
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Between the end of the nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth, 
whites’ efforts to enforce black inferiority in these new spaces met African 
American resistance and insistence on their right to make purchases.”65
Whites understood that no purchase by blacks asserted the subversive 
power of consumer politics more forcefully than buying a house, which, unlike 
other goods, imbued its owner with the legal rights and economic solvency that 
Jim Crow segregation sought to strip from southern blacks. Homeownership 
afforded blacks the legal rights due real property under common and 
constitutional law, which protected houses from illegal seizures and required 
warrants before entry by authorities. Also, a well-maintained house tended to 
increase in value, providing black homeowners with a source of money 
independent of white oversight. Throughout the Depression, many working-class 
whites found themselves competing with black laborers for jobs and housing in 
burgeoning industrial cities, despite formal and informal discrimination. 
Consumer politics and homeownership further disturbed already anxious 
working-class and middle-class whites by visibly showcasing that some blacks 
enjoyed greater material wealth than some whites. According to Hale, 
“Segregation then could never reattach racial and class identities, could not 
make middle-class blacks poorly clothed, poorly educated, and poor spoken and 
thus more easily identified by whites of all class as inferior.”66
The architects of New Deal housing policies clearly recognized the real 
and symbolic power of homeownership. Radford argues that New Deal housing 
policies established a two-tiered system. The Federal Housing Administration,
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which helped homebuyers finance purchases by insuring low-interest, long-term 
mortgages, represented the top tier. The FHA encountered little opposition from 
politicians or the general public because it provided indirect aid to mostly white, 
moderate-income homebuyers who often did not realize that federal assistance 
allowed a private lender to issue the mortgage. On the other hand, the United 
States Housing Authority, a federal agency created in 1937 to build publicly- 
owned housing projects for people unable to buy houses, represented the bottom 
tier. The 1937 United States Housing Act, which created the USHA, imposed 
spending caps on construction (an amendment proposed by Byrd) and tied new 
construction to slum clearance, which, in effect, reserved undeveloped suburban 
areas for FHA-backed home construction. Public-housing projects struggled to 
receive adequate funding because the general public generally viewed the 
projects as a government handout reserved largely for the poor, particularly poor 
blacks. Fiscal austerity and location limitations combined to create projects that 
looked exactly like what one architect feared they would look like — “those 
buildings which the government built to house poor people.” Author William 
Styron, a Newport News native, illustrated southern white resentment to the 
federal government helping black residents in his first novel, Lie Down in 
Darkness. The story unfolds in a fictional city based closely upon Styron’s 
hometown, borrowing street names, describing similar locales and hinting at local 
scandals. In one scene, two men talk politics over whiskey and ice on a lazy 
Sunday afternoon. “What about this New Deal?” a visiting real-estate agent asks.
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“Gonna give all the money to people who never worked for it, gonna give all the 
money to a buncha no-count niggers.”67
Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens exposed the growing fissures in 
Virginia’s paternalistically managed race relations. Crowded into slums and 
denied adequate wages, black tenants acted “in their own interests” and seized 
new housing opportunities. They sacrificed the comforts and ready assistance of 
established black neighborhoods to improve the lives of their families. Black 
tenants recognized the economic stability and bettered social position that 
homeownership provided, while the black community in general realized the 
corrosive power that homeownership posed to white supremacy by undermining 
long-standing economic and social restrictions through the “politics of 
consumption.” Home purchases also loosened the binds of white supremacy by 
allowing black homeowners to announce their economic solvency while also 
asserting their legal right to property ownership. Homeownership allowed 
Newport News’ black residents to claim a sense of citizenship by allowing them 
to pursue — as the Journal and Guide called it — “a fundamental creed of the 
true American.”
Swantown’s Failure
Uncertain of their own financial footing during the Great Depression, white 
residents rebelled against the two housing projects. The projects disturbed white 
Virginians’ sense of genteel paternalism, already undermined by the anonymity 
of urban life, by giving black tenants a greater degree of self-sufficiency through
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homeownership, albeit in segregated districts. Swantown, in particular, seemed 
to especially gall white residents by ignoring the federal government’s two-tier 
housing policy and allowing black homebuyers to buy houses in the same 
fashion as thousands of white families across the state. White opposition built 
more gradually against Aberdeen Gardens. Aberdeen Gardens maintained, at 
least in the eyes of the white community, the more acceptable appearance of a 
public-housing project, as a government handout to poor black families. Black 
tenants rented before being allowed to hold mortgages. The project’s larger size 
and its amenities, such as a community center, cooperative store and garden 
plots, also disassociated it from typical house purchases. Aberdeen Gardens’ 
excessive cost, though, violated white Virginians’ code of fiscal conservatism, 
opening the project to attacks from white residents who believed black tenants 
were receiving a greater share of federal tax dollars than they deserved. Battling 
racial conflict, both projects’ success hinged on strong support from the federal 
agencies and local sponsors that built them and from the black tenants living in 
them.
That support failed to materialize at Swantown where the plausible 
deniability of a legitimate sewer problem seems to have provided a convenient 
cover for inaction by white sponsors. Unfortunately, newspaper articles, court 
records, government papers and property deeds only hint at the private 
discussions that ultimately led to the decision to convert to white occupancy. 
However, the details that are known show a lack of support from Swantown’s 
financial backers — Southern Homes, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock,
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and the Federal Housing Administration — once prominent Warwick County 
businessmen filed a public nuisance lawsuit.68
Southern Homes offered virtually no help to the tenants, despite the firm’s 
direct responsibility for the faulty septic tanks. Residents complained that the 
company built shoddy houses as well as installed undersized septic tanks, which 
the Federal Housing Administration conceded when it spent $40,000 on 
renovations. Southern Homes also attempted to swindle black tenants before 
refusing to pay its share of repairs in a compromise remedy that its executives 
had proposed. Southern Homes executives showed the preeminence with which 
they held their own economic concerns, rather than those of the tenants, by filing 
for bankruptcy before the public nuisance trial began.69
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock possessed the economic pull 
and political clout (more so in Newport News than in Warwick County) to protect 
Swantown’s black tenants, but shipyard president Ferguson apparently took no 
public stand regarding the project. This seems fitting given Ferguson’s belief in 
promoting segregated neighborhoods to avoid racially charged conflicts that 
could erode the status quo of Virginia’s race relations. Ferguson said little 
publicly about the project, but he was the driving force behind-the-scenes to 
establish it. The Daily Press and Journal and Guide only fleetingly referred to 
Ferguson’s involvement in Swantown. Neither newspaper explicitly detailed the 
key leadership role he assumed as the president of the land company that sold 
the property to Southern Homes, as the president of the shipyard that employed 
most of the future homebuyers, and as the president of the bank that issued
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federally-guaranteed mortgages. Ferguson would have been comfortable in a 
dual role of public silence and private action, having done much the same thing 
during the Massenburg Law controversy in 1926 when he publicly promised to 
resign if Hampton Institute taught social equality while covertly undercutting local 
support for the white supremacists who advocated the law. The most direct ties 
linking Ferguson to Swantown during the time of the public nuisance trial stem 
from the selection of his son, William, as one of Southern Homes’ lawyers and 
from a bankruptcy lawsuit filed by construction supervisor Donald Love, who 
accused Alexander Laverty, Southern Homes’ president, of failing to collect debts 
owed by his friend Ferguson. Neither instance reflects strong, forthright advocacy 
for Swantown. However, it’s not unreasonable to wonder to what degree 
Ferguson might have attempted behind closed doors to influence events in favor 
of the black tenants.70
The Federal Housing Administration made an effort to salvage the houses 
for black tenants, but federal officials listed a litany of reasons for a lack of 
government intervention, including failed negotiations with Southern Homes and 
farmer Maney, regulations that barred the FHA from repairing houses it did not 
own, and court-ordered evictions that set the stage for the locally preferred 
alternative of white occupancy. FHA officials then seemingly acceded to the 
wishes of white banking and real estate interests — a stance the agency 
commonly assumed (and was frequently criticized for by civil-rights leaders) 
wherever controversy confronted black-occupied housing projects. The FHA 
advocated segregated neighborhoods and opposed residential integration into
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the 1960s, meaning officials were likely embarrassed by the Swantown debacle, 
and they likely preferred the least controversial way to fix it, regardless of public 
promises to return black tenants to their homes. Despite acknowledgement by a 
leading FHA official that Swantown was the agency’s only project “in real 
difficulty,” the agency’s annual reports failed to mention it.71
Black tenants sought to protect their houses to no avail by pleading not 
guilty to the public nuisance charge and testifying in court, and by paying extra 
money to Southern Homes to fix the septic tanks. They then spurred the 
development’s demise — well aware of the unwillingness of Swantown’s backers 
to assist them in a dilemma not of their making — by voluntarily going into 
foreclosure to protect themselves from additional financial losses. Shoddy home 
construction and petty snubs, such as streets named after Confederate officers, 
might have eased family decisions to forgo monthly house payments. Abandoned 
to Jim Crow discrimination, the black tenants chose to cut their financial losses. 
Joyce Brown Wilkins, then a teen-age girl living in Aberdeen Gardens, once 
asked her mother as she worked in her kitchen whether she regretted leaving 
Swantown. “There was no need banging your head against a brick wall when 
there’s nothing you can do about it,” she remembered her mother saying.72
Aberdeen Gardens’ Success
Meanwhile, Aberdeen Gardens was defined by the action, rather than the 
inaction, of its sponsors. Recognizing the need for interracial cooperation under 
Jim Crow segregation, Hampton Institute corralled local support, black and white,
before the federal government even appropriated money for construction. Unlike 
the shipyard at Swantown, Hampton Institute was intimately involved in guiding 
Aberdeen Gardens’ development. Howe advised an all-black sponsoring 
committee, which included educators from Hampton Institute and other leaders 
from the black community. The committee, which had an intimate and heartfelt 
connection to the people it sought to help, made suggestions to federal officials 
about the project’s design, ensuring that future black tenants lived in a 
community that satisfied their needs and desires. The committee also sought and 
received endorsements of the project from leading white businessmen, such as 
Ferguson, and politicians, such as Byrd. The general public was aware of the 
project at least eight months before plans were formally announced because 
articles in the Daily Press detailed the search for a location and tenants. This 
early consensus building buffered Aberdeen Gardens against later white hostility. 
When threatened by protests from white truck farmers, the sponsoring committee 
created an advisory panel that included white members. The move quelled 
opposition by satisfying white demands for more information and a greater role in 
planning. The move also stunted later opposition about the project’s cost.73
First the Resettlement Administration and then the Farm Security 
Administration proved invaluable allies, heeding the advice of local sponsors and 
outright rejecting white occupancy. Federal officials followed recommendations 
from the sponsoring committee and renamed the project Aberdeen Gardens and 
renamed the streets after prominent black leaders. Joseph H.B. Evans, the 
agency’s black affairs advisor, strongly rebuked initial news reports calling for
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white occupancy. Will Alexander and other top officials promised to defend the 
project, both publicly and privately. Federal officials and the sponsoring 
committee held a series of public meetings in October 1938 as black interest in 
the project lagged following Swantown’s failure. They assured residents that the 
houses were affordable, and they promised not to convert to white occupancy. 
Aberdeen Gardens disturbed local race relations, but strong and active support 
from local and federal sponsors allowed the project to overcome white 
opposition.74
Most black tenants moved into Aberdeen Gardens after the turmoil about 
its construction receded. However, they lived in quiet uncertainty for several 
years, remembering initial white opposition to the project and what such 
opposition had accomplished at Swantown. Many tenants initially refused to 
move into Aberdeen Gardens, asserting their own authority over local and federal 
officials, black and white, until they received repeated assurances that Aberdeen 
would remain a black-occupied project. Unlike neighboring whites, the black 
tenants did not view the houses as a government handout. Better homes came at 
a considerable sacrifice. Families uprooted themselves from the security of 
established neighborhoods to move into houses that white residents did not want 
them to own. Also, the well-built houses were not cheap. Monthly rents ranged 
from $11.25 to $15.50, and monthly payments for tenants planning to buy ranged 
from $17.32 to $21.47. The rents were somewhat higher than the $12.96 per 
month a government survey tallied as the average rent for black families. In 
comparison, Swantown’s black homeowners paid $13.20 per month on their
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mortgages. Even with supportive sponsors, Aberdeen Gardens could not have 
succeeded without the sacrifice and determination of its tenants.75
Joyce Brown Wilkins, now seventy years old, recalls little of the racial 
conflict that hounded her family from Swantown to Aberdeen Gardens. She 
mostly remembers with fondness her childhood days in Aberdeen Gardens. All 
her neighbors had chicken coops and gardens and new furniture. They lived in 
new brick houses with big back yards and apple and peach trees. Classmates 
from elsewhere surprised her when they talked about houses without running 
water, indoor toilets, freezers or wringer washing machines. She remembers 
overhearing adults talk about how whites did not believe blacks should live in 
nice brick homes with so many amenities. “Growing up in Aberdeen, we thought 
we were rich,” Wilkins said. “I think all the kids did.”76
Wilkins alludes to the challenges Swantown and Aberdeen Gardens 
posed to Jim Crow strictures regarding race, space and class when she talks 
about Aberdeen Gardens’ children believing themselves to be wealthy. The two 
housing projects gave black families an unusual chance to leave behind squalid 
slums with decrepit housing for well-built houses in new neighborhoods that 
promised better living conditions and appreciating value on investments. The 
houses violated the spirit of segregation by moving black families from 
established, resource-starved black neighborhoods into areas of nebulous racial 
orientation with extensive amenities. The houses violated white Virginians’ sense 
of enhanced paternalism and belief in white supremacy by showcasing the ability 
of black families to achieve the same goals as white families if given equal
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access to opportunity. Thus, white hostility ensued. Black families failed to 
overcome that racism at Swantown because they largely battled it alone within a 
system designed to handicap them every way possible. They triumphed over 
such racism at Aberdeen Gardens because their efforts were matched with 
support from local black and white leaders, as well as the federal government. 
Swantown illustrated business as usual during the Jim Crow era. Aberdeen 
Gardens served as one of many signals spotlighting the beginning erosion of 
paternalist-managed race relations and offered a glimpse of future strides in the 
realm of civil rights.
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TABLE 1
Newport News population by year and race 
Year Total White Black Percent black
1910 20,205 12,935 7,259 36 percent
1920 35,596 21,466 14,077 40 percent
1930 34,417 21,120 13,281 39 percent
1940 37,067 21,772 15,283 41 percent
Source: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Historical 
Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: U.S., 1790-1970. Anne Arbor: ICPSR. 
Internet database, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/census/. Numbers taken from 
decennial censuses.
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ILLUSTRATION 1
Houses in a black section of Newport News in September 1936.
Source: Photograph by Paul Carter. In the Farm Security Administration-
Office of War Information Photograph Collection, U.S. Library of Congress
(LC-USF33-010162-M3).
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ILLUSTRATION 2
A house in Swantown (now a neighborhood in Newport News) in June 2004.
Source: Photograph by the author.
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ILLUSTRATION 3
The kitchen in a house formerly occupied by an Aberdeen Gardens tenant in
November 1937.
Source: Photograph by Arthur Rothstein. In the Farm Security
Administration-Office of War Information Photograph Collection, U.S.
Library of Congress (LC-USF34-025990-D).
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ILLUSTRATION 4
Row of finished houses at Aberdeen Gardens in October 1937.
Source: Photograph by John Vachon. In the Farm Security
Administration-Office of War Information Photograph Collection, U.S.
Library of Congress (LC-USF33001015-M3).
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